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The Likelihood of Turkey's Accession into the European Union: A Controversial Inquiry ASHLEIGH HEBERT
I. Introduction
The European Union is an unparalleled economic and political partnership composed of twenty-seven European countries.
1 It was originally implemented to create an economic community, whereby states would become interdependent on one another. 2 The hope was that this interdependence would discourage conflict, as war would become catastrophic. 3 Over time,
this community evolved into a supranational organization with not only economic objectives, but social, cultural, political, and international objectives as well. 4 Because of the enduring success and unity the organization has achieved, the European Union has experienced continuous growth. It began with only six members in 1952 and expanded to twenty-seven members in 2012; 5 this number excludes one acceding country, 6 five candidate countries, 7 and three potential candidate countries.
8
In order to become a member of the European Union, a state must go through a rigorous screening process. 9 To begin, " [a] ny European country which respects the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law may" submit an application to the Council of the European Union. 10 If the application is accepted, the country will become a candidate country, and accession negotiations will begin. 11 However, acceptance is not automatic; for the Council to approve the application, the candidate country must have "stable institutions that guarantee democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities; a functioning market economy . . . ; the ability to assume the obligations of membership . . . ; and be able to put the EU rules and procedures into effect." 12 If the Council unanimously agrees that these conditions (the "Copenhagen criteria") have been met, accession negotiations will begin.
13
To conclude the next stage, negotiations have to be conducted in thirty-five chapters.
14 Each chapter is geared towards a particular subject matter with the goal of aligning the candidate country's laws with those of the acquis communautaire: the legislation, regulations, and cases that embody European Union law. 15 A few examples of these chapters include the free movement of goods, the free movement of workers, intellectual property law, agriculture, taxation, social policy and employment, external relations, education and culture, and the environment. 16 The European Commission examines each chapter and recommends whether negotiations should be opened. 17 Once a chapter is opened, negotiations will be conducted with the candidate country, and the completion time will depend on how quickly the country is able to reform its laws. 18 Once all chapter negotiations are concluded and both sides are satisfied with 10 Id. 11 Id. 12 Id. 13 The Mandate and the Framework, THE EUROPEAN UNION, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/the-policy/process-ofenlargement/mandate-and-framework_en.htm (last updated Jan. 30, 2012) . 14 Id. 15 Id. 16 Id.
17 Screening and Monitoring, THE EUROPEAN UNION, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/the-policy/process-ofenlargement/screening-and-monitoring_en.htm (last updated Jan. 30, 2012) . 18 Id.
the candidate country's progress, a Draft Accession Treaty will be created, and it must be signed by all members of the European Union. 19 After all member states and the acceding country ratify the treaty, the treaty will enter into force, and the acceding country will become a member state. 20 Turkey is one of the five countries currently engaged in accession negotiations. Turkey 2011 Progress Report, at 9, 29-31, SEC (2011 ) 1201 final (Oct. 12, 2011 Commission Staff Working Document: Turkey 2010 Progress Report, at 7, 23-25, SEC (2010 ) 1327 final (Nov. 9, 2010 The statutes and programmes, as well as the activities of political parties shall not be in conflict with the independence of the state, its indivisible integrity with its territory and nation, human rights, the principles of equality and rule of law, sovereignty of the nation, the principles of the democratic and secular republic; they shall not aim to protect or establish class or group dictatorship or dictatorship of any kind, nor shall they incite citizens to crime. iii. Drawing Conclusions
Based on these cases and the Kurdish population's long-standing struggle to achieve equality, it appears that the Turkish government will resist all efforts to debate the Kurdish situation in public forum. It is noteworthy that a large portion of the Kurdish population seeks a separate state through the exercise of the right of self-determination. appears the size of this minority has caused the Turkish government to consider the group to be a significant threat to the unity of the nation.
68
The dissolution of the United Communist Party of Turkey further supports the conclusion that the Turkish government will continue to dissolve parties that are sympathetic to the Kurdish minority. The United Communist Party was formed on June 4, 1990; ten days later, the Chief Prosecutor applied to the Constitutional Court for an order of dissolution. 69 By ordering the termination of a political party that had yet to participate in general elections, the government deprived society of the ability to debate the party's platform. The European Court of Human
Rights agreed with this view, calling this action "disproportionate to the aim pursued and consequently unnecessary in a democratic society." 70 It is difficult to fathom how a party that has yet to have any political activity could constitute a legitimate threat to democratic governance.
Thus, this outcome demonstrates the government's determination to prevent all public discussion regarding the Kurdish situation in light of its belief that this minority constitutes a significant threat to the unity of the nation. Because this pattern has continued for several decades, it is likely that parties that favor a solution to the Kurdish problem will continue to face dissolution until the constitution is amended.
C. Near Dissolution of the Justice and Development Party, the Ruling Party of Turkey
The Justice and Development Party currently has a majority of the 550 seats in 67 Ohri, supra note 30. After analyzing the evidence, the court concluded that Refah's leaders and members were using their democratic rights and freedoms in an attempt to replace democratic governance with a system based on sharia. 89 It went on to state that " [d] emocracy is the antithesis of sharia;" 90 the rules of sharia are incompatible with the notion of democracy, where secularism prevents the state from manifesting a preference for a particular religious belief. 91 Consequently, the party was banned, the five members who caused dissolution were stripped of their parliamentary status, and the banned members were prohibited from becoming a member of another political party for five years.
92
The European Court of Human Rights was asked to decide whether the dissolution violated the applicants' rights to freedom of association, as guaranteed by article 11 of the Convention. 93 It first indicated that dissolution constituted an interference with the applicants' rights. 94 The court further concluded that dissolution was prescribed by law; 95 although antisecular activities ceased to be punishable under criminal law, the constitution provides that parties can be dissolved for engaging in anti-secular conduct.
96
The next part of the analysis required the court to determine whether the interference sought to pursue a legitimate aim and whether it was necessary in a democratic society.
97
Without explanation, the court indicated that dissolution sought to protect national security and public safety, prevent disorder and crime, and protect the rights and freedoms of others. in considering whether the interference was necessary, the court noted that it must concentrate on three points: whether the risk to democracy was sufficiently imminent; whether the acts and speeches of the party's members could be imputed to the party as a whole; and whether the imputable acts gave a clear picture of the type of anti-democratic society the party advocated.
99
To begin, the court indicated that the risk to democracy was sufficiently imminent in this case;
there had been a considerable rise in the party's influence and a strong probability that it would become the ruling party. 100 In the 1995 general election, for example, Refah Partisi obtained 22%
of the votes and received 158 seats in parliament. 101 In the 1996 local elections, the party obtained 35% of the votes; moreover, an opinion poll indicated that this percentage could rise to 67% within a few years. 102 As for the second part of the necessary interference analysis, the court concluded that the views and speeches of Refah's members could be imputed to the organization as a whole. 103 The statements and acts of the chairman "could incontestably be attributed to
Refah" because he was the leader of his party and never indicated that the party had opposing views. 104 The same conclusion is reached in regard to the acts and speeches of party members:
their views taken as a whole demonstrate the type of society the party wished to implement, and case from other closure cases. From an outsider's prospective, it appears that the court was alarmed by the willingness to use force to achieve a new form of governance incompatible with democracy. 114 The court stressed that a system of governance based on sharia would be contrary to the principles of democracy; 115 in addition, it condemned the use of force to achieve a political objective. 116 Although the court strongly believes that democracy is incompatible with governance based on sharia, it cannot be said that the holding would be the same had the party's members stressed a transition through peaceful means. After all, the court has stressed that "freedom of expression as enshrined in Article 10 is applicable . . . not only to 'information' or 'ideas' that are favourably received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also to those that offend, shock or disturb . . . ." 117 Thus, although sharia law may appear to be utterly incompatible with the notion of democratic governance in the court's perspective, political parties have a right to debate the preferred form of governance. Moreover, the court has previously stressed that in considering whether to ban a party, an important factor to take into consideration is the party's willingness to resort to violence to achieve its political objectives. 151 In response to this allegation, the court noted that its case law indicates that the objective of article 2 is to ensure pluralism in education, a characteristic essential for democratic governance. 152 Thus, although the court acknowledged that educational curricula falls within the competence of state parties, a state may not "pursue an aim of indoctrination" that could be perceived as disregarding parents' religious beliefs. 153 It explained that a democratic society has an obligation to be impartial and neutral towards various religious beliefs to ensure pluralism.
154
In order to decide whether the curriculum is taught objectively, the court looked to the religious course syllabus and textbooks. According to the syllabus, the subject matter is to be taught in accordance with the principles of secularism and in a way that will 'foster a culture of 147 Id. ¶ ¶ 8-10. 148 Id. ¶ 10. 149 Id. ¶ ¶ 11-13. 150 Id. ¶ ¶ 1, 35. 151 Id. ¶ 35. 152 Id. ¶ 48. 153 Id. ¶ ¶ 51-52. 154 Id. ¶ 54.
peace and a context of tolerance.' 155 Thus, these objectives are compatible with the principles incorporated in article 2 through the court's case law. 156 However, the court went on to note that the syllabus provides for instruction on the Koran and Mohamed; likewise, the seventh grade syllabus provides for instruction on several fundamental aspects of Islam. 157 The issue became more problematic after the court examined the textbooks used by the Turkish government in primary and secondary education. These textbooks do not provide a general overview of the world religions; they "provide instruction in the major principles of the Muslim faith . . . such as the profession of faith, the five daily prayers, Ramadan, pilgrimage . . . etc." 158 In addition, students must take exams on the Koran and the daily prayers. 159 The court went on to conclude that although Turkey gives priority to the Islamic faith, it is the majority religion in the country, and thus, Islam-focused religious instruction alone cannot be viewed as indoctrination.
160
This, however, was not the end of the analysis: the court considered the allegation that no instruction was provided on the Alevi faith. 161 The court noted that a large portion of the of the fact that 99% of the Turkish population adheres to the Muslim faith) as long as it became more objective. 166 In 1990, Turkey's Supreme Council for Education indicated that children who adhere to the Jewish or Christian faith could apply for an exemption. 167 The court concluded that this exemption procedure did not provide sufficient guarantees to concerned parents.
168
Requiring students to reveal their religious affiliation to apply for an exemption poses a problem under both the Turkish constitution and article 9 of the Convention. 169 Moreover, by disallowing the possibility of exemption to the Muslim faith, the government was indirectly acknowledging 185 Id. ¶ 28. Her suspension was annulled when law number 4584 was passed ("which provided for students to be given an amnesty in respect of penalties imposed for disciplinary offenses and for any resulting disability to be annulled"), but she decided to pursue her studies elsewhere, nevertheless. In determining whether there was a violation of article 9, the court indicated that there was an interference with the right to manifest one's religion. 217 It also held that the interference was prescribed by law and "pursued the legitimate aims of protection of public safety, prevention of disorder and protection of the rights and freedoms of others." 218 However, Turkey was unable to establish the necessity of this interference in a democratic society. 219 The applicants were punished solely for wearing religious attire in a public place. 220 Moreover, there was no evidence that the group constituted a threat to public order or sought to exert their religious views on others. 221 In addition, the applicants did not hold an official status, and thus, laws concerning civil servants were inapplicable. 222 Finally, as opposed to other cases where freedom to manifest one's religion were subject to restrictions, these individuals were not convicted of wearing religious attire in a public establishment where religious neutrality might prosper over the freedoms laid out in article 9. 223 For these reasons, six of the seven judges voted that the convictions violated article 9. 224 
IV. Conclusion
Because Turkey is unwilling to effectively protect freedom of association and freedom of religion, it is unlikely that it will become a member of the European Union in the foreseeable future. In regards to the dissolution of political parties, both the European Commission and the Venice Commission are in consensus that significant constitutional reformation is needed to align Turkey's law with European standards. 225 Although several European countries have guidelines that provide for dissolution in exceptional circumstances, these laws are rarely effectuated. 226 Specifically, the Venice Commission noted that outside Turkey, dissolution laws have been implemented solely to ban marginal and extremist parties in Germany and Spain. 227 Thus, because the international community condones the excessive manner in which Turkey has utilized its dissolution law, it is unlikely that the European Commission will open, let alone close the "judiciary and fundamental rights" chapter. 228 This conclusion is strengthened because of the importance of political parties "in ensuring pluralism and the proper functioning of democracy." 229 Turkey's failure to adequately protect freedom of religion will equally (although to a lesser extent) prevent negotiations on the "judiciary and fundamental rights" chapter. 230 In regards to compulsory religious education, the European Commission continues to condone Turkey for its failure to implement the Zengin decision. 231 This denouncement stems from Turkey's digression from the European standard: almost all European countries permit students to opt out of compulsory religious education or make attendance optional. 232 Furthermore, Turkey appears too willing to restrict freedom to manifest one's religious beliefs. Although the European Court of Human Rights upheld Turkey's decision in Sahin v. Turkey, 233 this departure from precedent appears to be the result of the permitted margin of appreciation when it comes to limiting freedom of religion. 234 In Europe, there is no consensus on the proper relationship between the church and the state, and there is also wide diversity in the degree to which headscarves are regulated. 235 However, the court was unwilling to allow Turkey to stray too far from freedom to manifest one's religion: the court denounced Turkey's decision to impose sanctions on individuals who wore religious attire in a public area. 236 Thus, overall, it appears the unlikely Turkey will gain admission to the European Union until it can adequately protect religious freedom, a hallmark of modern-day democracies. 
